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RUUT VEENHOVEN
TWO STATE-TRAIT DISCUSSIONS ON HAPPINESS
A Reply to Stones et al.
ABSTRACT. Rejoinder to reaction by Stones et al. (SIR 36) on Veenhoven’s “Is
happiness a trait?” (SIR 32).
There are two discussions about the trait-likeness of happiness. One is con-
cerned with the possibility of creating greater happiness for a greater number. In
this discussion the focus is on variability of happiness level. The other discussion is
about chances for reducing inequalities in happiness. That discussion focusses on
permanence of differences in happiness. My thesis concerned the first discussion.
The criticism pertains to the second.
The criticism is framed in notions of psychological personality research. In line
with that tradition its conceptualizations are rather loose. The terms ‘happiness’
and ‘trait’ are used in broader meaning than in my article. In this respect the critics
conduct a different discussion as well.
Stones et al. present studies that would show that happiness is more trait-like
than state-like. Yet their evidence is not convincing. The data do not pertain to
happiness in the sense of life-satisfaction, and the interpretation of their data is
deficient.
For the time being it seems that happiness is not a fixed matter. In that respect
it is a feasible goal for social policy.
INTRODUCTION
My Thesis
Several theories deny Enlighted conviction that we can improve the
human lot. One of these is that happiness is largely a dispositional
matter.1 In that view, a better society does not make people any
happier, because subjective happiness is too invariant to respond to
improvements in real quality-of-life. In this journal (SIR 32) I took
stock of the empirical evidence for that theory in an article entitled
“Is happiness a trait? Tests of the theory that a better society does
not make people any happier” (Veenhoven, 1994). The theory was
checked at two levels; at the individual level and at the societal level.
The individual level variant of the theory presumes that happi-
ness is a psychological trait; either innate or acquired. It predicts
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that happiness will remain stable accross time and situation, and is
innerly causated. I checked these implications in a (meta)analysis of
panel studies. I concluded that: 1) Happiness is quite stable in the
short term, but not in the long run, neither absolutely nor relatively.
2) Happiness is not insensitive to fortune and adversity. 3) Happi-
ness is not entirely built-in; its genetic basis is at best modest and
psychological factors explain only part of its variance.
The societal level variant of the theory holds that individual
appraisals of life draw heavily on the collective outlook on life,
which is seen to have developed in earlier generations and passed on
through socialization. As a result, the happiness of citizens would
have little connection with the actual quality-of-life in their country.
I checked that prediction in an analysis of average happiness in
nations. The results pointed in the same direction: 1) Though aver-
age happiness remained quite stable in most countries, I noted some
profound changes, both in absolute happiness and in relative happi-
ness rank. 2) Average happiness in nations is clearly not independent
of living conditions. The greater the economic prosperity, political
freedom and social equality in a country, the happier its citizens
are on average. 3) The differences in average happiness cannot be
explained by a socialized outlook on life. This was most apparent in
the happiness level of migrants, which was closer to the level in the
country of settlement than that of their native country.
I concluded that happiness is no immutable trait, and that there is
still sense in striving for greater happiness for a greater number.
The Criticism
My article elicited a reaction in this journal (SIR 36) by Stones,
Hadjistavropoulos, Tuuko and Kozma: “Happiness has traitlike and
statelike properties, a reply to Veenhoven” (Stones et al., 1995).
Their critique concerns my argumentation at the individual level.
The following objections are raised:
Firstly, my critics read me frame the discussion in an ‘either-or’
question, happiness would be either a trait or a state. They rebut that
happiness can better be conceived as both a trait and a state.
Secondly, my critics object that I underestimate the traitlike prop-
erties of happiness. My review of research would be selective and
even faulty at some points.
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Thirdly, they claim that happiness is more traitlike than statelike.
In support of that assertion they present data from their own studies.
The general point is that I failed to acknowledge the wisdoms of
psychological personality research.
DIFFERENCES IN THINKING
Though the same words are used (‘happiness’ and ‘trait’) the crit-
icism is in fact about different things. It concerns another question
and different phenomena. Below I will first discuss these differences
in subject matter. Having past that babel, we can than more fruitfully
consider the empirical indications for the traitlikeness of happiness
in its original meaning.
Different Issues
In my article the question was whether happiness is so much a
trait that social policy can hardly affect it. In the context of that
question I focussed on permanence in level of happiness. The issue
was whether people remain equally happy trough time, even if their
situation improves or deteriorates.
My critics focus on permanence of interpersonal difference in
happiness. Their question is to what degree the happiest remain the
most happy relatively. That may be a common issue in psychological
personality research, but it is not the point here.
This difference is illustrated in the discussion on cross-situational
consistency of happiness. I presented evidence that adversity such
as unemployment results in a lower level of happiness. Stones et
al. rebut that trait-happy people will still remain happier in adver-
sity than trait-unhappy people (p. 133). They are probably correct,
but this specification is not relevant for the question at stake. The
question is whether social improvements, such as achieving full-
employment, will raise the general (absolute) level of happiness. Not
whether it will diminish existing differences in (relative) happiness-
rank.
The difference appears also in the discussion of cross-temporal
consistency. I emphasized that ‘absolute stability’ is most relevant in
this discussion. If happiness tends to remains at the same level, there
is little view on improving the human lot (p. 108). My critics see
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only ‘relative stability’, the degree to which interpersonal differences
persist. Again, that is not the point. The question is whether the level
of happiness will rise when living conditions improve. Not whether
the originally happiest maintain their lead.
As my aim was to test the claim that happiness cannot be raised,
it sufficed to show that happiness is not immutable.2 That is what
I did. By showing that happiness is not wholly traitlike, I did not
imply that it is entirely statelike.
Different Concepts
My critics deal not only with another problem than I did, but they
refer to different phenomena as well. What they call ‘happiness’ and
‘trait’ is something else than I meant.
Different Meanings of ‘Happiness’
Not everything called happiness is the same. Some things called
happiness can be more stable than others. That seems to be the case
here.
Different concepts of happiness. My review of research on temporal
stability of happiness was based on a definition of happiness as
“the degree to which an individual evaluates the overall quality of
his/her life-as-a-whole positively”.3 I restricted to studies based on
indicators that fit this definition. Stones et al. write they accept my
definition of happiness (p. 130). Yet apparently, they do not see the
consequences of that conceptualization.
This failure manifests first of all in the measurement of happi-
ness. My critics complain that my selection of happiness studies
is biassed,4 and that I did not include their happiness inventory
(pp. 133–134). They do not acknowledge that a lot of indicators
measure something else, and were discarded for that reason. Below,
I will explain in detail why their favored inventory does not fit my
concept.
The misreading of my definition also appears in the data-analysis.
As will be shown in the next section, Stones et al see their happiness
trait manifest in a ‘person-component’. This component involves
not just life-satisfaction, but a broad array of psychological charac-
teristics in the realm of ‘adjustment’. So my critics have a broader
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concept in mind. In their thinking happiness is a loose personality
syndrome rather than a specific judgement of life.
This difference in conception of happiness leads to different
conclusions about its traitlikeness. If happiness is conceived as
a personality syndrome, traitlikeness is more or less implied. If
happiness is conceived as a judgement of life, statelikeness is more
likely.
Incomparable indicators of happiness. The happiness measure used
by Stones et al. is the 24 item Memorial University of Newfoundland
Scale of Happiness (MUNSH; Kozma and Stones, 1980). This is a 24
item inventory. The first 10 items are about mood in the past months,
and are derived from Bradburn’s (1965) Affect Balance Scale. The
other 14 items concern various attitudes to old age and are drawn
from two adjustment-inventories; the PGCM (Lawton, 1972) and
the LSI-Z (Wood et al., 1969). Some of these latter items fit my
definition of overall happiness more or less (items 15, 20, 22, 23).
However, most do not fit the definition.
The items 11, 12, 14, 16, 21 are about perceived change in happi-
ness; they ask whether life has become less happy, or remained
equally satisfying. However, change in happiness is not level of
happiness. One can become less happy, but still be fairly happy; or
become happier, but still be miserable.
Item 19 is even farther away from life-satisfaction. It asks whether
one would like to live in another place or not. Yet preference for
another residence does not mark someone as unhappy. Being open for
a move does not necessarily mean that one is dissatisfied with one’s
present residence, and possible dissatisfaction with one’s residence
does not mean that one is dissatisfied with one’s life as a whole.
Item 24 is inappropriate as well. It asks whether one’s health is the
same or better than most people’s of the same age. However, health
is not the same as happiness, and certainly not health compared to
contemporaries.
The items 13, 17 and 18 tap specific moods. Together with the
first 10 items they could validly indicate hedonic level of affect (one
of the happiness-variants in my conceptualization).
This inventory may have beautiful psychometric properties, but it
does not measure happiness as defined above. It measures something
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more, possibly optimism. What it precisely measures is unclear. The
problem with this whole generation of adjustment inventories is their
lack of substantive precision. Elsewhere I characterized them as a
passed station in satisfaction research (Veenhoven, 1996: 3).
The MUNSH is not the only indicator of happiness used by my
critics. The first study they present as counter-evidence is based on
“happiness and depression indexes derived from factor analysis of
the CES-Depression scale (Radloff, 1977)” (p. 139). The precise
items in these indexes are not reported. I doubt that they cover the
above defined concept of happiness. Depression is not identical to
happiness. Though most depressed are unhappy, not all unhappy are
depressed.
Different Notions of ‘Trait’
Trait as all positive characteristics. As we will see below, Stones et
al. distinguish three components of variance in happiness: ‘error’,
‘situation’ and ‘person’. The person component is seen as the hap-
piness trait.
In this conceptualization, happiness merges with other personal
characteristics, such as health and personality. In their idea of happi-
ness that is no problem, happiness being a broad configuration of
positive characteristics. Yet my specific concept of happiness is no
longer recognizable in this mound.
This analysis limits the view on the nature of stability. One cannot
distinguish stability in happiness as such, from stability in its deter-
minants.
Trait as a specific disposition to judge life. In my article I differentiat-
ed the person component in dispositions that ‘constitute’ happiness,
and personal characteristics that may ‘facilitate’ its achievement.
An example of a stable constituent of happiness is the innate
proclivity to experience positive affect. Another example is an estab-
lished attitude towards life, which can exist more or less independ-
ently from affective inclination. In these cases the stability of
happiness is at the level of judgement. Such judgmental tendencies
are likely to manifest in all situations.
Examples of inner facilitators of happiness are health, personality
and aptitudes. Good health, for instance, is often instrumental in real-
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izing one’s goals in life. Likewise, some personality traits facilitate
intimate contacts (f.e. extra version). Intelligence can boost occupa-
tional success. The stability lies here in the continuous production
of pleasant life-events, which gives rise to a continuation of (state)
happiness. These latter facilitators will affect happiness less consis-
tently however; their effects on the evaluation of life are contin-
gent on life-goals and life-situation. For instance, bad health is less
pernicious to a pensioner than to a working mother.
Importance of the difference. This difference is crucial in the present
discussion about the possibility of making people any happier.
If judgements of life are dominated by traitlike ‘constituents’,
we are likely to remain equally happy or unhappy, irrespective of
the real quality-of-life in society. Chronic grumblers will always be
dissatisfied. Greater happiness for a greater number is no realistic
goal in that case, and happiness is hence no useful social indicator.
Continuity in ‘facilitators’ of happiness is less likely to fix happi-
ness to the same level. Firstly, their effects are contingent to life-
goals and life-situations. Hence their impact will level off in the
long run.5 Secondly, improvements in the quality-of-life are not
necessarily nullified in this case. If healthcare is improved in the
country, everybody could get healthier and hence happier, even if
the initial difference between the most and least healthy remains.
Still another thing is that the two kinds of dispositions require
different interventions in attempts to advance happiness.
Taking upon ‘constituents’ of happiness would involve boosting
positivism. In fictious ‘Brave New World’ that was accomplished
chemically with ‘soma’. In real life it is often tried by hurrah-
propaganda or courses in ‘positive thinking’. Happiness is then
improved without really improving life. From a humanistic point
of view this is morally dubious.
Seizing upon ‘facilitators’ means mostly that the persons capaci-
ties for achieving happiness are enhanced. This may involve healing
of health-defects or learning appropriate skills for coping with life.
This approach is more acceptable from a moral point of view. It also
seems more feasible.
Sound discussion on the possibilities to create greater happiness
for a greater number requires that these dispositional matters are
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distinguished. My critics seem to have missed that point. They shovel
all person variables on one heap and praise the pile.
DIFFERENCES ON DATA
Having clarified the differences in conceptualization, we can now
consider the differences on empirical issues. Stones et al. claim that
happiness is more traitlike than statelike. As we have seen that claim
is more or less implied in their conceptions of ‘happiness’ and ‘trait’.
The question here is whether their evidence applies to my original
conceptions as well.
Situational Stability
In my article “Is happiness a trait?” I reviewed the available research
on situational stability of happiness (in the sense of life-satisfaction).
The review involved 14 cross-sectional studies and 9 panel studies.
These studies involved misfortune such as bereavement, unemploy-
ment and having a handicapped child. The data showed that
happiness is not insensitive to fortune or adversity. People in bad
situations tend to be less happy than people in good situations, and
people who’s situation improves tend to become more happy where-
as people who’s situation deteriorates tend to become less happy. I
concluded that happiness is no immutable trait.
Stones et al. doubt that conclusion and claim that ‘happiness is
more traitlike than statelike’. They present three studies as counter-
evidence.
The first study is among caregivers who differ in two respects:
1) place of residence of the recipient (inside or outside an institu-
tion), and 2) ailment of the recipient (dementia or another infirmity).
These situational differences appear almost unrelated to (change
in?6) ‘happiness’ (in fact: depression).
The second study is a follow-up among elderly institution resi-
dents, and compares the effects of two kinds of psychosocial
treatment. The differences appear to be minimal; MUNSH-scores
remain largely the same over the period studied, that is: equally low.
The third study is a pre/post-treatment assessment as well, now in
a control group design. It demonstrates a treatment effect. MUNSH
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scores rise somewhat in the experimental group, yet again these
subjects remain profoundly despondent (p. 140).
Stones et al. estimate the statelikeness of ‘happiness’ by its vari-
ation that is attributable to experimentally induced change (called
situation component). The traitlikeness of happiness is estimated by
the continuity in happiness (called person component). Their model
also involves an error component. They conclude that the stable vari-
ance of happiness exceeds reactive variance in all these cases and
present that as evidence for their claim that happiness is generally
more trait-like than statelike (p. 141).
This counter-evidence is not convincing however. Not only are the
measures of happiness inadequate (as shown above), but also can
the results not be interpreted that way.
Firstly, the unchanged dejection of these elderly patients does not
illustrate the general point that happiness is unchangeable. Clearly,
their despondency is largely determined by their unfortunate situa-
tion. In this condition of impairment and dependence even a trait-
optimists would fall into chronic state-dejection. Most subjects will
have been happier in their better years, but apparently their happiness
is not so traitlike that it withstands this miserable situation.
Secondly, the situational differences studied are trivial. There is
not much difference between having one training or another in study
2. Even the difference between having a treatment or not (study 3)
is not very significant in the total of life-experiences. No wonder the
‘situation component’ in these studies is so small.7
Thirdly, the situational component does not involve all situa-
tional effects, but only the experimental effect. The studies did not
take stock of other changes that took place in this period, such as
deterioration in health or loss of mates. In the design used by Stones
et al. these unobserved life-events disappear in the error component.
Further, the periods studied are short.8 In the short run there is
typically too little situational variation in the lives of the subjects
to distinguish between stability in situation and stability in the
judgement of it. Serious estimates of the traitlikeness of happiness
must consider its stability across major cumulative life-change, over
decades.
A last thing to note is that eldery nursinghome residents are not
the most appropriate cases to study long term stability of happiness.
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Variation of happiness will be low in this population, because chronic
depression is a common admission criterion. Situational variation is
limited as well, because life is short and without turns.
These experiments may be useful for their original purpose of
indicating effects of care-arrangements in a given institutional con-
text. Yet they bear no relevance for the wider question whether a
better society can make people any happier.
Temporal Stability
In my article I focussed on ‘absolute’ stability of happiness, in other
words on invariance in happiness-level. My question was whether
people are so much geared to a certain evaluation of life that substan-
tial improvements in their living conditions does not materialize
in greater satisfaction with life. I also reported data on ‘relative’
stability, which concern rankorders in happiness. That latter matter
was not essential in my reasoning. It pertains to the possibility of
reducing differences in happiness, rather than to the issue of raising
the general level of happiness. I had better left it out.
My critics seize upon that sidestep and claim that I underestimate
the (relative) stability of happiness. Though besides my point, their
criticism is worth considering in its own right.
In my paragraph on stability in happiness-ranks I reviewed the results
of panel-studies that used measures of happiness that fit my def-
inition. Four studies among adults observed 10 to 15 year over-
time-correlations from +0.03 to +0.46 (average +0.30). One 40 year
follow-up among adults found over-time-correlations between +0.15
and +0.28 (average +0.23). Four studies among children followed
into adulthood found 14 to 20 year overtime-correlations between
 0.11 and +0.31 (average +0.18). On that basis I estimated that
happiness-rank in young adulthood explains only 10% of happiness-
rank in late adulthood. My estimate was based on the square root of
average correlations, disattunuated for measurement error.
Stones et al. read the data differently. They estimate the stability
of happiness-rank among adults at 60% over ten years and 50%
over forty years. The difference is in three things. Firstly, Stones
et al base their estimate on the highest correlations observed. The
average would seem more appropriate. Secondly, they do not use
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the square root, but the full correlation. That is correct when one
can assume that no real change has occurred in the true score in the
interim. When the aim is to estimate change, the square root is most
appropriate. Thirdly Stones et al. add 20% stability for “more rigor-
ously validated measures”. The measures they aim at are probably
the earlier discussed inventories that measure something else than
happiness in my sense. So that revaluation does not apply either.
On the basis of this reading Stones et al. further conclude that
“the temporal stability of happiness meets the requirements of a
trait : : : ” (135). That is a bridge too far. Even if one estimates
overtime correlations high, one must still acknowledge that they may
largely reflect situational stability. Subjects who are in an advantaged
social position at the start, are likely to be relatively well off at later
observations as well. Hence they will be relatively happy at both
occasions, even if there is no happiness trait at all.
In this context, it is worth noting that my these overtime corre-
lations have been observed in affluent nations in an era of stability.
The stability of happiness-rank is likely to be considerably lower in
poor countries (where one hits the bottom sooner) and in times of
turbulence (where positions change more often).
Another thing to note is that my critics ignore my reference to
the study of Chiroboga (1984), who found that 11 year overtime
correlation disappears when initial personality and social status are
controlled (p. 114).
Heritability of Happiness
Temperament can affect both absolute happiness-level and relative
happiness-rank. In my article the focus was on happiness level.
The question was whether innate characteristics might predispose
to a certain evaluation of life, irrespective of actual quality of life.
In answer to that question I presented the results of a study on
resemblance of happiness in mono- and dizygotic twins. In hindsight
I had better left that out as well, because these data say more about
relative happiness-rank. Yet again the issue deserves attention in its
own right.
I cited a study by Wierzibicki (1986) who measured happiness
by means of a mood diary. Average mood appeared more alike
among mono-zygotic twins (r = +0.55) than among di-zygotic twins
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(r = +0.15). Given the still considerable mood differences among
mono-zygotic twins, I gathered that genetic influence is ‘modest’. I
further noted that the genetic component may involve other traits
than happiness-as-such (‘constituents’). The observed momenta-
neous correspondence can also be in heritable ‘facilitators’ of happi-
ness, that loose impact in the long run.
Stones et al rebut that the genetic factor is not at all modest.
With heritability estimated by h = 2(rmz   rdz) they calculate its
contribution to happiness as 80%. They should have used h2, which
yields 64% in this case. I admit that this is more than modest.
Meanwhile I came across a similar study which involved accept-
able items on life-satisfaction. This is Loehlin and Nichols (1976)
study of 850 sets of twins. The correlations observed there are
much lower: among mono-zygotic twins the average correlation is
+0.21, among di-zygotic twins +0.10.9 Disattenuated for measure-
ment error, true correlations will be about +0.30 and +0.15.10 This
yields a heritability estimate of 10%. This is really modest.
The difference between these studies is possibly in the aspects
of happiness measured. Affective tone may be more heritable than
cognitive appreciation of life. This illustrates my contention that
given characteristics do not always transpose identically to the evalu-
ation of life.
CONCLUSION
My critics refer to a different discussion, their arguments pertain to
another issue, another concept of happiness and another notion of
trait.
The initial question was whether a better society breeds happier
people, and concerned fixedness of the ‘absolute’ happiness-level.
The criticism is about permanence in ‘relative’ happiness-rank.
The original question concerned happiness in the sense of life-
satisfaction. The critics conceive happiness as a broader ‘personality’
syndrome.
The initial notion of happiness ‘trait’ was quite specific, and
concerned a disposition to judge life positively or negatively. The
critics refer to ‘trait’ as continuity in all personal characteristics,
including health.
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The criticism is framed in notions of psychological personality
research. That approach may bear relevance for the question whether
differences in happiness can be reduced. Yet it is not appropriate for
answering the question at stake: whether it is possible to raise the
average level of happiness.
The counter evidence that would show that happiness is more trait-
like than state-like is not convincing. The measures of happiness used
are not appropriate and the interpretation of the data is not adequate.
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NOTES
1 Another theory that denounces the possibility of creating greater happiness for
a greater number is the theory that happiness is ‘relative’. In this journal (SIR 24)
I have inspected the evidence for that theory as well (Veenhoven, 1991).
2 My critics depict this nul-hypothesis as a ‘strawman’. This qualification would
be correct if no one believed that happiness is immutable. That is not the case
however. I cited several authors who stressed its fixed character (p. 104), for
example Costa et al. (1987: 305) who wrote “: : : happiness is ultimately also
independant of health, youth, power and other life-circumstances : : : ”.
3 Stones et al. see redundancy in this definition: ‘overall quality’ would be the
same as ‘life-as-a-whole’ (p. 130). They are wrong.
The term ‘overall’ refers to the criteria of evaluation and emphasise that
happiness-judgements cover all criteria. This is to distinguish with criterion-
satisfactions, such as satisfaction with excitement in life.
The term ‘life-as-a-whole’ depicts the object of evaluation. This is to
distinguish with domain-satisfactions, such as satisfaction with marriage. See
Veenhoven (1984: 23).
4 Stones at. al. note that I focus on face-validity, and disregard traditional psycho-
metric criteria, such as construct-validity, discriminant-validity and reliability.
They are correct in that.
The point is that I restrict to indicators that unequivocally refer to happiness in
the sense of ‘the overall appreciation of one’s life-as-a-whole’. The best way to do
so is close reading of questions (face validity testing). Quantitative psychonometry
is typically of little use for establishing substantive meaning. For that reason
most indicators in my selection are single direct questions. Most multiple item
inventories in this field mix up different things, things which may go together, but
which still are not the same.
I am well aware that much psychological testing emphasises psychometrical
consistency rather than substantive distinction, for instance IQ-tests. When these
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instruments are used to predict behavior, that is not much of a problem. If IQ-
scores adequately predict school success, we can live without a precise definition
of intelligence. The case of happiness-measures is different however. These are
used to asses a quality in its own right. Hence it must be clear that the measures
tap that particular quality and not something else.
5 If so, the long term stability of happiness will be lower than the long term
stability of personality. This seems to be the case indeed. Overtime correlations
of happiness are at least low over 10 to 30 year periods. See next paragraph.
6 It is not clear whether this study really involves a follow-up or simply assesses
co-variance between ‘happiness’ on one hand and ‘situation’ and ‘personal charac-
teristics’ on the other. As I cannot figure out what this study involved precisely, I
will refrain from further comment.
7 This is the problem of the bottle half full or half empty. The results of study 3
can also be interpreted as showing that happiness is not insensitive to single minor
changes in one’s life-situation. If so, major cumulative change is likely to have a
pervasive effect. The studies on summed life-events mentioned in Table 2 of my
earlier article show this is the case indeed.
8 Study 3 covers 18 month. The timespan of study 1 and 2 is not reported. I
assume these studies cover a limited period as well.
9 Analysis based on the items 464, 634, 654, 673 and 692 in appendix B.
10 Assuming 0.70 reliability of these single items.
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